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When differences in the language, religion, tradition and cul-ture in general grow into an obstacle to the communication
between nations, the possibility of living together becomes doubt-
ful. The burden of historic heritage in the Croato-Serbian relation-
ship has become intolerable due to Serbian rejection to recognise
Croatian independence. Through violence, plunder, banishment
and devastation of the Croatian villages and towns, the Serbs have
declared against co-existence with the Croats. Can the Plan of
Peaceful Reintegration convince the expelled Croats and other
non-Serbs that living together is possible? The Plan offered ad-
ministrative solutions that neglect essential characteristics of the
area (historical prerogatives, migrations, wars, cultural differences).
The displaced persons do not see the Plan as a humane, materi-
al and moral satisfaction, but rather as additional protection for
the Serbs. They have formed their returnees' consciousness mainly
from the point of view of their everyday living needs and expec-
tations, which so far have not approved or accepted all details of
the Plan.
1. INTRODUCTION: LIFE AS LIVING TOGETHER
TO live means to live with other people. Living together is a an inevitablecondition of each liVing being. There is no choice - existence is always co-
existence. Awareness of this is characteristic of a rational nature of human be-
ing. However, most essential in human rationality is to find a modus of living
next to someone else and, by all means, a reason for it.
Pre-industrial societies interpreted living together as a mutual effort with the
aim of common survival; collective interest completely eliminated individual in-
terest. Industrial societies arrange living together by a contract, that is, the dif-
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ferent interests of individuals are not denied but are brought into co-existence
through a contract which limits them.'
The terms of contract-defined relations are today the backbone of institution-
alised reality. To obey the law is an obligation of every good citizen which is ac-
cepted without analytically evaluating the restrictions on individual freedom.
Individuals accept certain roles (the role ofvoters, for instance) and participate
in certain procedures as a part of the social system (election for instance) by
which they give legitimacy to existing reality (Luhmann: 1992:44-55). Such an
institutionalised socialisation is today understood as a result of the historical
development of civilisation which has offered most "bread and freedom" in de-
mocratic capitalism." The example of institutionalised socialisation in the USA
made living as the co-existence of different nations, religions and cultures
into a reality. The starting point is a liberal approach to personal freedom in or-
der to realise individual potentlalitles.'
Naturally, such development of civilisation is not present in all climates, in all
nations and cultures. There have always been those who wanted more and
better, and those who wanted what others had. Weber took this difference in
attitudes as playing an essential role in the development of a rational capital-
istic economy. The mentality of trading, speculating, swindling and robbing be-
longs to the past (late Rome, China). Mentality characteristic for the West is
rational gaining of profit (Weber: 1976:130-1). Both mentalities cannot exist for
long in the same region and at the same time. We shall take this as a basis for
the analysis of the situation in Croatia.
The co-existence of Croats and Serbs has not been fruitful for both nations
from the very beginning. Dinko Tomašić finds the reason for the divergent
mentalities of these two nations in the difference of "autochthonous cultures".
For the Croats a tradition of co-operative agriculture and cattle-breeding has
been characteristic; for the Serbs a tribal culture of caUle-breeding and theft
(Tomašić:1993;890). The co-existence of these two mentalities is hard to
achieve and short-lived. Its final result is war, meaning freedom for one nation,
and defeat for the other. Each war, regardless of its result. changes the con-
1
There should be mentioned Durkheim's distinction between mechanistic and organic solidarity, as
well as the importance of social contract in the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau and others.
2
Supporting arguments can be found in the following books: M. Novak, Duh demokratskog kapita-
lizma (Zagreb:Globus-Školska knjiga, 1993), F. Fukuyama, Kraj povijesti i posljednji čovjek (Zag-
reb: Hrvatska sveučilišna naklada, 1994), P. Berger, Kapitalistička revolucija (Zagreb: Naprijed,
1995). .
3
M. Friedman highlightes that Iiberalism has as its basic concern belief in the dignity of an individ-
ual, in individual's opportunity to realize full potentialities by own choice, but on the sole condition
that the freedom of one person does not infrige on the rights of others. M. Freidman, Capitalism
and Freedom (Zagreb: Globus-Školska knjiga, 1992: 201).
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ditions of co-existence, and thus creates different assumptions about sharing
a way of life in future.
2. HISTORICAL HERITAGE AS
A BURDEN OF CO.EXISTENCE
The problem of co-existence was seemingly aetualised with the first multipar-
ty elections in 1990. The term seemingly is stressed, because this problem has
persisted for several centuries and refers to the multinational co-existence of
Croats and Serbs.
Slavonija, and in particular its eastern part, encountered this problem in the
period of the conquest of Turks (1526-1687). From the so called "little paradise
of Catholicism" (Čuljak: 1994;195), this region became exposed to islami-
zation, influences of the reformation, and as time passed, to the most persuasive
penetration by the Orthodox creed.' By organised colonisation, the Serbian
population inhabited depopulated regions of Croatia. Under the leadership of
the Patriarch Arsenie III Crnojević about 30 thousand Serbs immigrated to
Eastern Slavonija in 1690. Immigration was also taking place in the 18th cen-
tury, during the Patriarch Arsenie IV (Kolarić: 1985;134). The relationship to-
wards Serbian immigrants and the consequences of their immigration were
described by a Jesuit Antun Kanižlić, arespectable Slavonian of that time. He
described that Vlasi arrived along the Danube looking for a better living, found
in Slavonija the "celebrated Slavonic language", and brought with them cus-
toms of cursing and the abuse of father, mother, religion, soul and grave. By
this, he says, they produced a ''Turkization of the language" (Kanižlić: 1760:XI-
XII, nonpaq)."
Religion, language and customs are the most distinctive differences between
nations. They do not have to be, necessarily, the sources of hostility, but they
become so from the moment when they are imposed on another religion, lan-
guage and customs. In the period of domination by the Austria-Hungary dual
monarchy in Croatia the threat to the Croatian language, tradition and religion
came mainly through attempts at Germanization and Hungarization. Some
Croatian intellectuals and politicians tried to resist this danger, even through
4
Writing that may be consulted: Butorac, J. Katolička crkva u Slavoniji za turskog vladanja (Zagreb:
Kršćanska sadašnjost 1970), Bčsendorfer, J. Crtice iz slavonske povijesti (Osijek 1910), Mažuran,
I. Popis naselja i stanovništva u Slavoniji 1698. godine (Osijek: JAZU 1988), Šuljak, A. Vjerske or-
ganizacije u sjeveroistočnoj Hrvatskoj, Proceedings Hrvatska - povijest sjeveroistočnog područja
(Osijek 1994: 188-207).
5
The writing of the same author indicated religious intolerance between Slavonians - Roman Cha-
tolics, and immigrated Serbs who were more willing to accept Islamization than Roman Catholi-
cism. (KanižIić: 1760.x1l1, nonpag).
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forming an alliance with the Serbs and other South Slavs, which seemed to
them less threateninq." However, since 1918, and in particular after the death
of Sije pan Radić in 1928, awareness of the problems of co-existence with the
Serbs in the same state has been increasingly present. During the Second
World War, the Communist Party revived the idea of a single state as a means
of struggle against fascism and Stalinist pressure later on (Županov: 1995;36-
7). Giving priority to classes instead of nationality, in accordance with the spirit
of its ideology, communist authority tried to develop a sub-nationalist sense of
Yugoslavism as a substitute for national consciousness. This was achieved
mostly through the systematic atheisation of society. How unsuccessful it was,
can be best documented by the 1953 and 1991 population census (Table 1).
Not only had the population not turned atheistic, but, the number of Roman
Catholics had even increased and the number of those who did not belong to
any faith, had decreased. The first multiparty elections also showed that na-
tional consciousness had not deteriorated either.
Table 1
Distribution of Croatian population by confession
Year
Confession 1953 1991
Roman Catholics 73.9% 76.6%
Orthodox 11.3% 11.1 %
Other religions 1.3% 6.6%
Not religious 12.5% 3.9%
Unknown 1.0% 1.8%
3. WAR - A NEW BURDEN OF CO·EXISTENCE
ln the summer of 1991, in Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western Srijem, a
newera began with regard to the relationship between Serbs and Croats,
Hungarians, Slovaks, Ruthenians and other non-Serbian nationalities. In sum-
mary, this relationship can be described as genocide. Confirmation of this de-
6
ln the time of Strossmayer, Croatia was endangered by Germanization from one side and
Hungarization from the other. The idea of unification of South Slavs was a kind of reaction to that
threat. That aspect of national threat has to be kept in mind when the development of the idea of
Yugoslavism is discussed. (Županov: 1995.37)
Corresponding was the opinion of the French historian P. Garde stating that Yugoslavia is a term
invented by the Croats; a project developed by Strossmayer which was a good concept and the
best solution, but was very hard to achieve. A lot of good will that was needed had not existed in
the monarchic Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs. (From the interview published in Nedjeljni
Vjesnik, 13 October 1996)
On political attitudes of J. J. Strossmayer the following book can be consulted: Pavić M, Cepelić
M. Biskup Josip Juraj Strossmayer, Đakovo 1994 ..
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scription are the numerous devastated villages and cities (from Ćelije to Vuko-
var), a lot of people killed and taken away, as well as about one hundred thou-
sand displaced persons. It was accompanied by destruction and devastation
of anything that represented the 13-century long period of the presence of
Croats and Christianity in this region. It should be stre ssed that 65 catholic
churches and chapels, 13 monasteries, 19 prior houses, and 21 crosses were
destroyed or severely damaged, and church possessions were mostly robbed
and devastated (Srakić:1994;343-400).
Five years later, taking into account all that Serbs have done to croats' and
other non-Serbian nationalities, the question of another possibility of living to-
gether is extremely actual for the process of "peaceful reintegration".
What tone can be ascribed now to the quotation "We shall return!" which
echoed in the thoughts of displaced persons leaving their homes, and which
was repeated many times at local and national levels? This thought was buried
deep in the consciousness of the displaced, more as a reminder to "settle
debts" with their persecutors, and less as a confirmation of peace, forgiveness
and forgetting. "Anyone who was listening to the confessions of the displaced
could learn a number of facts about what the Serbs did to other non-Serbian
neighbours. These doings do not have to be that heavy that one could add
them to the war-crime lists. But they do not have to be more cruel, either.
Abolition of crime in neighbouring community is, thus, the hardest to attain.
Since many of the escaped Serbs reasonably consider that this will be hard to
achieve, they preferred to leave. Their number should not be surprising. The
crimes they have made were also numberless." (Rogić:1995;184.).
The war has brought new, by now the greatest burden in the relationship of
Croats towards Serbs. The time that passed was too short to speak of the ef-
fects of forgetting. Besides, all crimes were recorded: genocide, culturoeide
and ecocide in the east of Croatia were the central theme of numerous jour-
nalists and writers." The discovery of mass graves in the presence of media (in
Vukovar, Tordinci) even more revives the fear of the days not so long gone.
Besides, the continuous recurrence of new misunderstandings about the be-
ginning of the return to Baranja, Eastern Slavonija and Western Srijem makes
displaced persons less and less patient. Their readiness to accept demands
put forward during the slow development of "peaceful reintegration" becomes
more dou btfu I knowing that a new co-existence with their persecutors has
been planned in advance.
7
The exiled population consisted of 93.8% of Croats and of 95.2% Roman Catholics by confession
(Rogić: 1995.74-76).
8
Following are several titles that trustworthy recorded the events in the east of Croatia during the
years 199111992: Topić D, Špišić D (1992) Rat prije rata, Vinkovci, Runtić D (1992) Rat, Vinkovci,
Runtić D (1993) Rat poslije rata, Vinkovci, Nazdar V (1993) Sjene rata, Osijek, Rem G (1994) Či-
tati Hrvatsku, Osijek-Zagreb, Otvoreno sveučilište Osijek-Dureiux.
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4. AND NOW, CO·EXISTENCE AFTER ALL?
After the spring ("Bljesak") and summer ("Oluja") 1995, "peaceful reintegra-
tion" meant a stretched hand of forgiveness to the remaining devastators of
Eastern Croatia. But what did the stretch ed hand imply? The meaning of
"peaceful reintegration" could be understood in three ways:
- for the Croatian state it was a way to reach its eastern, internationally ac-
knowledged borders, but also a demonstration of good will to show the co-op-
erative and peaceful politics of Croatia;
- for the Serbian rebels it was a way to achieve as good a position as possi-
ble in the negotiations and to avoid sanctions for what had been done, ap-
pearing as peaceful seekers of national rights;
- for the displaced persons from Eastern Slavonija, Baranja and Western
Srijem, it was a way to return to their century-old hearths.
ln this last instance, "peaceful reintegration" was understood as a necessity for
displaced persons to live with those who expelled them. In other words,
"peaceful reintegration" as a political substitute for co-existence, is a term
which is expected to be more readily accepted by the public. But its final out-
come should be not only the physical reintegration of the Croatian occupied
territory, but also the recroatisation of this region. A revitalization of the Croa-
tian spirit involves the return of the expelled Croatian inhabitants. Their return,
according to the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration, does not involve the depar-
ture of those who declared themselves against co-existence, five years aqo."
Here we come to the point of questionable "digestivity" of the Plan, that is, co-
existence.
The source of data on the attitudes prevailing among the displaced was a sur-
vey carried out on the sample of 1499 displaced persons from Baranja, Eas-
tern Slavonija and Western Srijem. The methods, subjects and instrument are
described by Kaliterna and Rimac (1997) and Šakić et al. (1997).
Whether the displaced persons accept life with the Serbs presently living in
Baranja, Eastern Slavonija and Western Srijem? (Table 2)
9
According to the Erdut Agreement the Transitional Administration was accepted in the intererst of
all the persons resident in/or returning to the Region (Article 2). "All persons who have left the
Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent residence in Croatia, shall en-
joy the same rihts as all other residents of the Region." (Article 4). "All persons have the right to
return freely to their place of residence in the Region and to live there in conditions of security. All
persons who have left the Region or who have come to the Region with previous permanent
residence in Croatia, will have the right to live in the Region." (Article 7). (The text of the Basic Agree-
ment on the Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranya and Western Sirmium)
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Table 2
Can the Serbs stay?
Do you agree that Serbs presently inhabiting Eastern Slavonija,
Baranja and Western Srijem, should continue to live there? %
1. All who wish have the right to stay (except war criminals) 24.7
2. Only some members of the Serbian nationality can stay 39.3
3. Not any of the Serbs can stay 30.6
4. Something else 1.3
5. Don't know, cannot estimate 4.2
lt seems that the possibility of co-existence is not an utopia. For 24.7% of
those interviewed all the Serbs presently living in eastern Croatian may stay
there, except war criminals. As many as 39.3% of the interviewed were ready
to make a compromise (only some Serbs could stay), while 30.6% rejected any
possibility of living with the Serbs. The question is whether these answers re-
sulted from an inclination ofthe displaced persons to forgive, or from their wish
to return home at any cost, or, perhaps, from being insufficiently informed of
the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration and what it offers. The level of acquain-
tance with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration, and how the displaced persons
evaluated it is shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3
Displaced persons and acquaintance
with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration





Attitude toward the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration
Attitude toward the Plan %
1. Completely agree 11.9
2. Mostly agree 38.2
3. Mostly disagree 19.9
4. Completely disagree 14.1
5. Not well informed 15.9
The preceding tables show that majority ofthose interviewed (46.2%) are mod-
erately familiar with the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration and almost one third of
them (31.9%) are well informed. Slightly more than one fifth are not satisfac-
torily informed (21.8%). But, when the attitude toward the Plan was in ques-
tion, as many as 50.1 % of the interviewed displaced persons support it (com-
pletely or mostly) and much fewer disagree (34% do not agree with the Plan
"mostly" or "completely").
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The greatest importance of the Plan lies in the possibility of a peaceful solu-
tion to the conflict (for 39.1 % of the interviewed). Among the drawbacks of the
Plan, in the first place is living with the Serbs again (31.9%), which is most em-
phasized among the displaced persons from Vukovar (Table 5). This can be
explained as a consequence of most manifested hostility toward non-Serbs
that culminated in 1991. Vivid memories of the status of the non-Serbs in this
region over the period of two preceding Yugoslavian states also contributed to
the lack of readiness of the displaced persons from Vukovar to accept co-ex-
istence.
Table 5
Chief drawbacks of the Plan by municipalities
% of interviewed by municipality Whole
Beli sample
Drawbacks Manastir Osijek Vinkovci Vukovar %
Living with Serbs 27.3 22.4 13.2 41.8 31.9
Slow implementation of the Plan 17.5 21.0 7.9 10.2 13.0
Plan is completely unacceptable 3.5 3.7 1.2 3.9 3.4
Possibility of stay for war criminals 2.0 1.5 0.8 4.4 3.0
Plan supports interests of the
Serbs more than of Croats 3.5 3.1 1.8 2.1 2.5
Local authorities and police mixed
of the Serbs and Croats 0.4 1.5 1.8 2.1 1.6
Insecurity upon return 1.6 0.6 0.5 1.5 1.3
Slowing down of establishing
completely Croatian authority 0.4 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.2
Possibility of stay for Serbian newcomers 0.7 0.2 0.1 1.7 1.1
Insufficiently protected interests
of the displaced persons 1.9 0.8 0.6 0.8 1.0
Threatened living security 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
Insufficient means for reconstruction 0.3 0.2 0.3 -0.1 0.2
Possibility that Serbs stay in Croatian houses 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0
No major drawbacks 7.1 8.7 19.3 3.1 7.1
Don't know, cannot estimate 32.1 33.5 50.4 25.9 31.8
The question whether the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration supports the inter-
ests of the Serbs more than of Croats was positively answered by as many as
68.5% of the displaced persons interviewed. Only 14.7% did not share the
same opinion (Table 6).
What will be the reaction of members of the Serbian nationality to peaceful
reintegration and co-existence? Can they forget what they have done to their
yesterday's neighbours and meet them with the arguments that they were mis-
lead and forced to act as they did, or that all that has been done was carried
out by other, non-domestic Serbs? Most displaced persons believe that their
return would mean emigration of the Serbs (58.8%); only 12.1 % maintain that
Serbs would adjust to Croatian authority. Distrust toward the Serbs showed
13.3% of the exiled; they think that Serbs will continue with the efforts to ere-
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ate "their state" (Table 7). These attitudes suggest that displaced persons ac-
cept co-existence as a real option, because the majority of "sinners" will leave.
Table 6
Whom the Plan protects?
Plan protects interests of the Serbs more than of Croats %
1. Completely agree 41.6
2. Mostly agree 26.9
3. Mostly disagree 8.3
4. Don't agree 6.4
5. Don't know 16.7
Table 7
Will the Serbs leave?
What will members of Serbian nationality
do after the Croatian authority will be established? %
1. Majority will emigrate 58.8
2. Majority will stay and conform to Croatian authority 12.1
3. Majority will stay and proceed with efforts to realise "their state" 13.3
4. Something else 2.3
5. Don't know, cannot esti mate 13.4
The members of Serbian nationality who remain in eastern Croatia will be one
real but not the greatest difficulty for the returning displaced persons, consid-
ering the organisation of their everyday life. Evaluating the difficulties that the
displaced persons expect to encounter upon their return, it can be seen that
relations with the Serbs are not perceived as the most dominant. Table 8 shows
that "Problems with Serbian neighbours" came in fifth place, and "Possibility
that Serbs participate in local authorities" in eighth place out of ten difficulties
listed.
Table 8
Expected difficulties in the life of displaced persons upon their return
Difficulties to be encountered by the displaced persons upon their return %
1. Threatened personal safety (danger from mines, weapons, planted bombs etc.) 73.8
2. Lack of money 71.6
3. Bad living conditions for children and adolescents
(lack of schools, kindergartens, playgrounds, etc) 54.5
4. Difficulties in adaptation to living conditions in general 52.9
5. Problems with Serbian neighbours 48.7
6. Lack of population capable of working 46.1
7. Unemployment, poor economic prospects 44.0
8. Possibility that Serbs participate in local authorities 41.2
9. Bad organisation and functioning of local authorities 19.5
10. Poor traffic communication with other parts of Croatia 13.4
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A breakdown of the sample by municipalities shows that the population ex-
pelled from Vukovar is conslderably more cautious about "Serbian neighbours"
as well as "the Serbs in local authorities" (difficulties 5 and 8). A majority of dis-
placed persons from Vukovar, 63%, saw Serbian neighbours as problems and
54.6% participation of the Serbs in local authorities (Table 9). In relation to the




Difficulties Beli Manastir Osijek Vinkovci Vukovar
1. 59.0 69.8 65.2 83.9
2. 60.5 68.7 71.7 77.1
3. 32.3 39.0 51.7 69.2
4. 34.6 42.8 46.7 65.5
5. 37.7 35.7 28.1 63.0
6. 31.9 33.2 43.6 56.6
7. 28.7 35.9 42.7 53.2
8. 30.6 34.1 17.1 54.6
9. 9.7 8.9 14.7 28.1
10. 6.9 6.0 10.2 19.3
From the data given in Table 10 it can be seen that in making decisions about
their return, members of Serbian nationality are not the crucial difficulty for the
majority of displaced persons. The banished population maintains that com-
plete implementation of the Croatian authority (97.1 %) and living security
(97%) are "very important". Repair of objects essential for normal life was the
third factor influencing their decision about the return (92.7%). The possibility
of living without Serbs was listed in sixth place (58.8%).
Table 10
What conditions are important in making decision to return?
To what extent are the following circumstances
an influence on your decision to return? %
1. Completely established Croatian government 97.1
2. Personal and family safety 97.0
3. Reconstruction of objects necessary for normalisation of life in a village
(medical service, schools, etc.) 92.7
4. Obtaining adequate help for restitution of lost properties 89.8
5. Possibility of employment or other means of obtaining the means to live 75.6
6. Possibility of living without Serbs 58.8
7. Departure of UNTAES and other UN military forces 47.5
8. Something else 1.5
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lt seems that minds of the displaced are not oppressed by a feeling of the
impossibility of living next to the Serbs to the degree which would make it cru-
cial in bringing their decision about return. But the question should be put in
another way if one would like to know whether there is a certain degree of con-
fidence in the Serbs who will meet the displaced persons. As already indicat-
ed by Table 7, the displaced persons suspect that the Serbs will still try to cre-
ate their state. And if they would have the control in some village or city, would
there be a place for non-Serbian nationalities? The majority of displaced per-
sons answered negatively: 89.7% would not return to their villages if run by the
Serbs (Table 11). This is a good indication that confidence as a crucial require-
ment of living together does not exist.
Table 11
Trust in Serbian authority
Would you return to your village reintegrated
in Croatia but with Serbian local authorities %
1. I would return because it would still be part of Croatia 1.2
2. I would return only if the Croatian authority
could guarantee safety and a peaceful life 2.8
3. I would return if all conditions set by the Croatian authority
would be respected and personal safety guaranteed 1.4
4. If the village would be controlled by the Serbs
I should not return under any condition 89.7
5. I do not intend to return regardless of local authority 2.5
6. Don't know, cannot estimate 2.5
Distrust toward Serbian authority is so great that it almost wipes out native con-
sciousness and patriotism. This could be illustrated by Table 12 in which two
variables are crossed: one dealing with the patriotic feeling of the displaced
persons and the other showing the trust of exiled non-Serbs toward the rule of
the Serbs. From this contingency table it is obvious that even 91.1 % of dis-
placed persons who consider their original place of residence their only home-
land, would not return there if the Serbs would be included in the authorities
(row 1, column 4). Thus distrust in Serbian authority is so strong that displaced
persons are more ready to discard their home-ties than accept Serbian rule.
Table 12
Perception of the native place and attitude toward Serbian local authorities
Attitude toward Serbian local authorities (2)
Perception of the place (1) 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
1. 1.1 2.8 1.5 91.1 1.3 2.2
2. 0.8 3.2 0.3 86.1 8.6 1.0
3. 0.0 0.0 0.0 82.9 4.6 12.5
4. 14.1 1.5 0.0 23.8 40.4 20.2
5. 0.0 0.0 0.0 89.4 0.0 10.6
6. 2.3 0.0 0.0 78.7 10.5 8.5
Total 1.2 2.8 1.4 89.7 2.5 2.5
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Question 1:
Whether you think that the place of your exile is your home-village (that is, the
place you are attached to by particularly strong emotions)?
1. It is my only home.
2. There are several places where I feel as in my home-village
(to which I am strongly attached).
3. My home-village is somewhere else, I was only a newcomer
in this place or "passer-by".
4. There is no place which I feel my home-village.
5. Something else.
6. I have no definite opinion.
Question 2:
Would you return in the situation where, after the peace is completely restored,
your Village would be returned to Croatia but local authorities would be run by
the Serbs liVing there?
1. I would return because this would be a part of Croatia, however.
2. I would return only if Croatian rule could guarantee a safe and
peaceful life.
3. I would return under some other conditions.
4. If the village would be controlled by the Serbs I should never return.
5. I do not intend to retum, regardless of the local authority.
6. Don't know, cannot estimate.
The great majority of exiled, regardless of nationality do not accept return if
Serbs would participate in local authorities. Column 4 in Table 13 shows that
there is no significant departure from that attitude among exiled Croats, Hun-
garians and other non-Serbian nationalities, as well as among exiled Serbs. In
column 1 it can be noted that only 1.2% of the displaced persons would accept
return to their home-village because it is a part of Croatia, regardless of local
authorities. This attitude is particularly significant for the Croats (88.1 % in the
interviewed sample) who maintain that Croatia without authorities run by the
Croats is not their optimal liVing territory.
Table 13
Nationality and relationship toward Serbian authorities
Attitude toward Serbian local authorities (2)
Nationality 1 2 3 4 5 6
Croat 1.2 2.4 1.3 89.9 2.8 2.3
Serb 3.5 13.5 0.0 73.4 0.0 9.5
Hungarian 0.9 0.4 0.6 94.4 0.0 3.7
Other 0.0 4.7 4.7 90.3 0.3 0.0
Total 1.2 2.8 1.4 89.7 2.5 2.5
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Strong distrust toward life in which the local authority would be run by the
Serbs does not leave room for a bright vision of future co-existence. But the
fact is that displaced persons create their picture of the return on the assump-
tion that in the reintegrated area Croatian rule will be completely revived.
There will be no Serbs participating in the rule in their vision.
ln a number of displaced persons a disbelief that they would return home soon
is caused by the slow process of peaceful reintegration. Table 14 shows that
28.9% of displaced persons had a pessimistic vision of the future, and almost
the same percent of the displaced persons are uncertain about this (27.7%).
Among the displaced persons 43.5% hold that the future will be better than the
present situation. The Croatian authority should bear in mind the present atti-
tudes of the displaced persons and do everything possible to turn their pes-
simistic view into optimist impatience as the only feeling that can stimulate re-
croatisation and development of still occupied territory.
Table 14
Feelings prevailing among the exiled
ln your opinion what feelings prevail today among the displaced persons? %
1. Pessimistic view and fear that the future cannot result with good 28.9
2. Optimism, belief that things will be better soon 43.5
3. Cannot estimate 27.7
5. CONCLUSION
The failed option of co-existence experienced by non-Serbian inhabitants in
the Croatian east in 1991 made them displaced persons and war-affected peo-
ple. Their wish to return home after the summer of 1995 has become a realis-
tic prospect to be fulfilled soon. On the other hand, the military actions the
"Flash" ("Bljesak") and "Storm" ("Oluja") make any further delay even harder.
From month to month, impatience about the return became a growing burden
to actual policy. A politically formulated model of peaceful reintegration has not
paid attention to pre-defined terms in all its stages, and has become one of the
central topics among the displaced persons. More and more frequent demon-
strations of refugee-representatives and mass meetings are a warning that
displaced persons are again put in the situation of "refugee as a victim" as it was
in 1991, and this position is far from the desired status of "displaced person as
an independent and self-organised factor" (Rogić:1995.125-7).
Such a course of events, very slow for the exiled, brings into question the op-
timistic perception of tomorrow among the displaced persons. Their belief that
the Plan of Peaceful Reintegration primarily protects the interests of the Serbs,
supports a dominant attitude that the Croatian authority could have done more
for the displaced persons. Discord between the expectations of the displaced
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.persons and the effectiveness of the Croatian authority can be interpreted by
the distinction between "objective facts" and "subjective meaning" as well as thro-
ugh the existence of "separated sub-universes of meanings" (Berger-
Luckmann:1992.33-4, 106). The present reality for the displaced persons, and
their return are uncertain, and not definitely understood in the institutionalised
scheme. The right to return, with adequate human, moral and material satis-
faction define the meaning of the return in the minds of the displaced persons.
Institutionalised reality, that is a Croatian authority and international presence,
do not negate such an approach to the return, but modify it. The "now" sug-
gesting immediate return, is transformed into a process which has as its final
goal a universal, Le. general and not particular, meaning. For every authority,
Croatian as well, the legitimacy of its concept, that is its objective realisation
and subjective acceptance are essential (Berger-Luckmann:1992.115). But
difficulties arise in both segments; in acceptance as well as in the realisation
of some stages of the Plan. It is known that difficulties primarily result from the
disagreement of the "other side", and it is also hard to expect that a concept
of liVing together and circumstances that could make it acceptable to both
sides would occur overnight.
The very concept of co-existence, offered by the model of peaceful reintegra-
tion is an outcome of the administrative approach of diplomacy at the world
level. Historical details of the territory to which it should be applied are ne-
glected (from historical supremacy, migrations and wars, to cultural differ-
ences). Certain achievements of formerly created concepts of co-existence
are also omitted, such as, a catholic understanding of co-existence. The con-
cept in question develops trust among people at three levels: the level of sim-
ple personal relationships, the level of seeking the truth and the level of co-op-
eration in practical achievements (Dijalog:168.9). The degree of applicability in
this region, dominated by Roman Catholics, should be by all means investi-
gated (Šundalić:1996).
***
ln conclusion, can it be said that among the displaced persons from the
Croatian east, a returnee-formed consciousness prevailed as a confirmation
that the model of peaceful reintegration is accepted? The answer lies with the
fundamental characteristics of how displaced persons see their return.
The first point to be stress ed is that the majority of displaced persons intend to
return to their native areas. The fact that not all of them want to return, should
not be surprising taking into account the length of period of their status and the
awareness of what awaits them upon their return. It is known from worldly ex-
perience that "about one third of an emigrated population never returns to their
native place, regardless of the modality of migration." (Wertheimer-
Baletić: 1993 .209).
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Secondly, return is understood among displaced persons as return to their
homes. It could attain the dimensions of "the debt toward the homeland", "re-
turn to their home-village" etc., but not the dimension of "readiness for recon-
ciliation, forgiveness and forgetting". This is confirmed by the attitude of the
displaced persons that among all the handicaps of the Plan, the greatest is the
insistence on living again next to the Serbs.
Third, the belief that the majority of the Serbs would leave before their return
is very strong. This would mean that prerequisite for a tolerable life with the
rest ofthe Serbs who have not committed any crimes against the exiled neigh-
bours, would have to be fulfilled.
Fourth, distrust toward Serbs, in local authorities in particular, is so strong that
displaced persons do not accept co-existence conditioned by local authorities
run by members of Serbian nationality.
Fifth, displaced persons do not base their returnee-awareness primarily on the
difficulties of daily life with the Serbs, but on the guarantees for their personal
safety and material aspects of their lives. The guarantees they see in complete
revival of the Croatian authority in the whole region.
Translated by Vesna Hajnić
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Kada razlika u jeziku, vjeri, tradiciji ili kulturi postane zapreka ukomunikaciji među narodima, tada je među njima suživot upi-
tan. Ovakav teret povijesnog naslijeđa u odnosima Hrvata i Srba
dobio je dimenziju neizdrživosti zbog srpskog neprihvaćanja drža-
vne samostalnosti. Nasiljem, pljačkom, progonima i pustošenjem
hrvatskih sela i gradova Srbi su se izjasnili protiv suživota. Mogu
li se planom mirne reintegracije uvjeriti prognani Hrvati i drugi ne-
-srbi da je suživot moguć? Plan je ponudio administrativna rješe-
nja koja zaobilaze bitne specifičnosti ovoga kraja (povijesno pr-
venstvo, migracije, ratovi, kulturne razlike). Prognanici u njemu ne
nalaze humanu, moralnu i materijalnu satisfakciju, već prije sve-
ga zaštitu Srba. Oni su stoga svoju povratničku svijest više obli-
kovali iz obzora svojih potreba i očekivanja koja uvjetuje život, a
koja nisu do sada u cijelosti potvrđivala prihvaćenost svih potan-
kosti plana.
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Wenn Unterschiede in Sprache, Religion, Tradition oder Kulturzu Hindernissen in der Kommunikation zwischen den Vol-
kern werden, ist es fraglich, ob ein Zusammenleben noch mogli ch
ist. Die 8i.lrde des geschichtlichen Erbes in den 8eziehungen
zwischen Kroaten und Serben wuchs bis zur Unertraglichkeit an,
als die Serben es ablehnten, Kroatien als selbstandigen Staat an-
zuerkennen. Durch Gewalt, Pli.lnderung, Vertreibung und Verwi.l-
stung kroatischer Dorter und Stadte llefsen die Serben keinen
Zweifel daran, dass sie gegen ein Zusammenleben mit den Kroa-
ten waren. Kann der Plan der friedlichen Reintegrierung die ver-
triebenen Kroaten sowie andere Nichtserben von der Moglichkeit
eines Zusammenlebens i.lberzeugen? Der Plan bietet administra-
tive Losungen an, in denen wesentliche Spezifika dieses Raums
(geschichtlicher Vorrang, Migrationen, Kriege, kulturelle Unter-
schiede) umgangen werden. Die Vertriebenen erblicken darin kei-
nerlei humane, moralische und materielle 8efriedigung, sondern
in erster Linie eine Inschutznahme der Serben. Die Einstellung
der Vertriebenen im Hinblick auf die ersehnte Ri.lckkehr ist daher
eh er von 8edi.lrfnissen und Erwartungen gepragt, die durch das
Leben seibst bedingt sind, die sich je doch nicht in alle Einzelhei-
ten des Reintegrierungsplans finden kčnnen.
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